The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

### STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE NATIONAL GUARD ENHANCED BRIGADES: THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND THE FUTURE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TERRY L. ROBINSON North Dakota Army National Guard

19960529 019

#### **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:**

Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited

**USAWC CLASS OF 1996** 



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

#### **USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT**

### THE NATIONAL GUARD ENHANCED BRIGADES: THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND THE FUTURE

by

Lieutenant Colonel Terry L. Robinson North Dakota Army National Guard

CAPT Richard L. Recordon, USNR

Project Adviser

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barrack, Pennsylvania 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

#### **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: Terry L. Robinson (LTC), North Dakota Army National Guard

TITLE: The National Guard Enhanced Brigades: The Past, The Present and the Future

FORMAT: Strategic Research Project

DATE: 12 March 1996 Pages: 41 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The National Guard Enhanced Brigades are a result of the Bottom-Up Review and are to represent the greater share of rapid deployable combat forces found in the Army National Guard. A special task force, comprised of all components of the U.S. Army was tasked with designing the Enhanced Brigades. The mission of the Enhanced Brigades is to support our active combat force and provide the strategic hedge against an adverse conflict; especially to be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. The Enhanced Brigade concept is new and therefore the strategy used to build them, train them and deploy them has been created exclusively for their purpose. That training strategy is guided on several key factors, most of which are centered on readiness, ensuring that the brigades will be ready to deploy within 90 days of postmobilization training. This report depicts the history of the Enhanced Brigades, analyzes their structure, mission and enhancements and then discusses future decisions and concerns which need to be addressed before the Enhanced Brigades can successfully accomplish the mission. The Enhanced Brigades are a critical piece in our nations National Military Strategy and decisions affecting their future are no less critical.

#### LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figu	re	Page
1.	Pre-Mobilization Annual Training Requirement	8
2.	Active and Reserve Component Force Generation Model	10
3.	Enhanced Qualities and Which Elements Supporting Them	12
4.	Light Infantry Enhanced Brigade Organization	13
5.	Mechanized Infantry Enhanced Brigade Organization	13
6.	Armor Enhanced Brigade Organization	14
7.	Armor Cavalry Enhanced Brigade	14
8.	Post-Mobilization Training Requirements	18
9.	Ground Force Readiness Enhancement Organization	26
10.	Directed Training Associations	27
11.	Heavy Enhanced Brigade Post-Mobilization Generation	31

#### INTRODUCTION

"Reserve Component forces are an integral part of our armed forces and are essential to the implementation of our defense strategy.\(^1\) Today, new regional dangers have replaced the global Soviet threat and, as with our active forces, we must adapt the reserve components to meet these new challenges.\(^1\) 2

"Our approach is to seek compensating leverage, that is to use the Reserve Components to reduce the risks and control the costs of smaller active forces.

Compensating leverage does not mean maintaining larger Guard and Reserve forces.

Rather, it means making smarter use of the Reserve Component forces that we have by adapting them to new requirements, assigning them missions that properly utilize their strengths, and funding them at a level consistent with what will be expected of them if we have to use them during a crisis or war."

The above comments are quotes from the infamous Bottom Up Review (BUR) conducted under Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense in 1993. Although the report has been the subject of countless debates and discussions from the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the smallest, most obscure offices in the Pentagon, it has become the basic foundation for the establishment of future roles and missions of our national military.

The National Command Authority (NCA) used the report as a primary tool to evaluate, re-think and re-write our National Military Strategy (NMS) in the post cold war era. All of our military establishments, not excluding the U.S. Army, have used the BUR to re-examine their own respective missions and roles. It has been a powerful impact on our current and future force structure and their role in our National Military Strategy.

#### **OBJECTIVE**

The Enhanced Brigades (EBs) of the Army National Guard are a direct result of the BUR. This paper will examine the factors surrounding the creation of the EBs, review their mission, examine the force structure and, most importantly, will examine the latest training strategy written exclusively for the EBs. In conclusion, the report will show how the EBs will support the goals of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) as originally desired by the OSD, Department of the Army (DA) and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). To accomplish this, the EBs must be resourced properly and allowed to fully implement the latest training strategy. Several key issues that are, as of yet, unresolved will be examined and recommendations will be made concerning those issues.

It should be remembered that the effective dates for the EBs, the date that all fifteen EBs will be in place, is September 1, I996.<sup>4</sup> This analysis of the latest training strategy is a preliminary look. But certainly a contemporary analysis of the proposed strategy will lend a great deal to whether or not the EBs will be able to provide the "compensating leverage" as originally intended by the BUR.

In testimony in March 1994, before the House Committee on Armed Services and the subcommittee for Military Forces and Personnel, Deborah Lee, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs made the following statement:

"The Bottom-Up Review developed policy guidance on the future size and missions of the Reserve Components to meet the challenges of the post-cold war world. Increased reliance on the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve was a very important part of this guidance, using the concept we call 'compensating leverage', which is to make use of the Guard and Reserve to reduce the risks and control the costs of our peacetime force.....The restructuring plan for the Army Guard and Reserve will help us do all of this by supporting three items.

First, it will help us to support the national military strategy under the BUR which, as you all well know, is to be able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. The Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades, very specifically, are a very important force enhancement in the BUR which, when combined with other factors, will allow us to successfully implement the strategy.

The second item is to provide force for strategic insurance. Now what I mean by strategic insurance very simply is this: quite often, we in the Department of Defense are told that we constantly prepare to fight the last war instead of preparing to fight the next war. We also know from human experience Murphy's law says, 'if things can go wrong, they will.' That is to say we cannot always predict with certainty where, when, and how the next war may occur. So we have strategic insurance to ensure that, in the event a conflict is more prolonged than we hoped, or if democracy should fail in the former U.S.S.R., or if we should need additional forces for rotational purposes, that we have them in place and we have them in the most cost-effective place, that is to say in the Reserve Components.

The third element is to ensure, as was alluded to in the opening statement, that the National Guard retains needed capabilities to meet the requirements of the State Governors for domestic emergency."

#### **FORMAT**

This review of the EBs will be done using the tenets of strategy as our road map. Strategy, as the military has come to agree, consists of ends, way and means. We can express this concept as an equation: the ends or end state of strategy equals objectives (objects towards which one strives) plus ways (courses of action), plus means (resources needed to support the ways). This general concept can be used as a basis for the formulation of any type of strategy.<sup>5</sup>

This report will follow that philosophy of strategy. First we will examine the "ends", the desired end state for the EBs. We will look at the historical setting that resulted in the formation of the EBs, the actions that did in fact lead to their creation. In doing so, we will

examine the mood of the defense world from the perspectives of the National Command Authority (NCA), the OSD, DA and NGB and most importantly, the Congress of the United States.

We will then look at the "ways" that shaped the EBs, the concepts used to design their structure and their table of organization and equipment, (TO&E) We will look at the mission, the equipment package, the personnel package and the "means", the resource strategy. We will then review the proposed training strategy and link all of this together to determine if the ways and means, the packages and the resources, combined with the training strategy will produce the desired end state.

#### **END STATE - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

General J.H. Binford Peay III, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army in 1994, made the following statements in a prepared brief to the same Congressional hearing as previously mentioned:

"America's Army is confidently and aggressively moving out to build a twenty-first century force. Our Army is changing; changing in response to new global dynamics and because the nation requires a new kind of Army. We are guided by a vision, America's Army. An Army comprised of Active, Guard, Reserves and civilians, trained and ready....a strategic force serving the nation, at home and abroad, capable of decisive victory...into the twenty-first century.

To achieve this vision, the Army is reshaping itself into a power projection force - a power projection Army - that is primarily based in the continental United States and that will remain the preeminent land combat force in the world. A power projecting Army that consist of a new partnership of all components. A **seamless** Army that provides the nation a force that is versatile and relevant to current global demands."

Today, 7000 Guardsmen and Reservists are part of the three divisions of our contingency corps - ready to deploy anywhere in the world in thirty days. More than 108,000 Reserve Component soldiers are part of the five division force that must close anywhere in the world within seventy-five days.<sup>6</sup> In the first hours of a future crisis it will be Active forces, along with reshaped Guard and Reserve units and individual specialists, that will be the initial authors of military victory. Army Guardsmen and Reservists will be among the first to answer the call to mobilize and deploy forces and will reinforce operations with a blend of specialized capabilities that exist only in our Reserve Component. This robustness and specialization is critical to the warfight in the days ahead.<sup>7</sup>

General Peay III went on to say, "Army leaders of all components understand the changing nature of our Army and have made great strides during the last few years in tearing down old antagonisms and stamping out the burning embers of discord.

We are dedicated to accomplishing two major goals: First, we understand the need to forge a new, more vibrant, and more cohesive partnership among all the components in America's Army. Second, we are dedicated to reshaping Cold War era Active and Reserve Component organizations, policies, programs, and structures into those appropriate for a power projection strategy. We are guided in our efforts by the conviction that building the Power Projection Army consistent with these two goals requires devising policies, programs and procedures that insure that the force is **capable**, **affordable**, **deployable**, **accessible** and **expandable**.<sup>18</sup>

A 1990 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on recent activations of the Guard and reliance on the National Guard and Reserves lays out guite clearly the pros and

cons of a heavy reliance on the citizen-soldiers. In general, CRS noted that the Congress has been supportive of increased goals and responsibilities for the National Guard while the Department of Defense (DOD) has tended to be in favor of a broadly symmetrical reduction in Active and Guard components.<sup>9</sup>

CRS stated that most reasons cited by opponents of increased reliance on the Reserves used arguments concerning mobilization, accessibility, readiness and increased hardships on Reserve Component members. Proponents of increased reliance, however, have shown that lower reserve mobilization thresholds, ensuring activation of a least some Reserve Components, will save money in the long run. Supporters of increased reliance also contend that not all forces required for a military action are needed immediately. Even when a rapid response is required, there will rarely be enough airlift and sea-lift to move all the needed forces at the same time. Thus sufficient time will be available for reserve units to be mobilized and trained before movement to the theater of operations. Figure 1 depicts the mobilization requirements.

Numerous argument exist on both sides. However, support for reserve forces in combat roles has remained steady in congress and the current Army force structure is a result of that policy. This is reconfirmed by statements made as recently at March, 1994 at a House of Representative meeting of the Committee on Armed Services, and the subcommittee for Military Forces and Personnel. Congressman lke Skelton, Chairman of the sub-committee stated, in reference to proposed force structure changes presented at

# PRE-MOBILIZATION TRAINING ANNUAL REQUIREMENT

- Annual Training supported by GFRE
- Lane training during Inactive Duty Training supported by GFRE
- AC associated Division evaluation
- AC associated Division assurance of Title XI mandates
- Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) with AC associated Division during commander's tour
- Battle Command Staff Training Exercise
- Brigade Command and Battle Staff Training (unless participating in BCTP)
- Gunnery (Table VII VIII) assistance by AC associated Division

Figure 1 Pre-mobilization training annual requirements

that time by members of DOD, "Consequently, if we are in fact reducing our active military to a one-war force, we need to recognize that reality and reshape our National Security and military strategies and the related Guard, Reserve, and Active forces structure accordingly, to ensure that our total force will be ready and can be mobilized to win two wars.....it will mean placing even more reliance on the Reserve Components to mobilize and integrate Active forces to fight in a second conflict when the Active force is engaged."

The BUR has resulted in considerable changes in the Army with force structure and mix being two of the most noticeable. The BUR concluded that we can maintain a capability to fight and win two major regional conflicts and still make prudent reductions in

our overall force structure - so long as a series of critical force enhancements to ensure the ability to halt regional aggression quickly are implemented. One of these enhancements is the identification, training, and resourcing of fifteen Army National Guard "Enhanced Brigades".<sup>11</sup>

In November 1993, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans directed the Army Training Directorate to lead the effort with respect to the EBs. A Task Force was created consisting of representatives from the Army Secretariat; the Army Staff; the Office of the Director, Army National Guard; the Office of Chief, Army Reserve; Forces Command; and, the Training and Doctrine Command. Their mission was to:

- 1. Clearly define what the BUR and the (DPG) infer with respect to the fifteen Enhanced Brigades.
- 2. Define what the Army expects these brigades to do.
- 3. Determine the deployment standards for these brigades.
- 4. Develop a training strategy that meets these standards.
- 5. Determine required levels of personnel and equipment readiness the Army National Guard must maintain in these brigades. 12

#### **END STATE - THE MISSION**

The DPG states that Joint and Service planners anticipate four to five Active Component (AC) divisions should be sufficient, under normal planning assumptions, to win any one single major regional conflict.<sup>13</sup> However, the need to hedge against adverse

possibilities must be considered in the design of the overall active and reserve force structure. The EBs are intended to provide the strategic hedge against an adverse major regional conflict, especially in the two, nearly simultaneous, major regional conflict scenario, referred to in the DPG. The EBs will be used to reinforce or augment AC forces deployed to a regional conflict. They may also be used to backfill AC overseas presence forces that have been committed out of theater. Finally, EBs will be capable of supporting rotational missions when protracted Active Component (AC) deployment to a major regional conflict requires relief of committed forces.<sup>14</sup>




Figure 2 Force Generation Model

#### **END STATE - THE COMMANDERS INTENT**

In April 1994, following an Army Enhanced Brigade Task Force, then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan made the decision to create the EBs. This decision established the fifteen EBs as the principle Reserve Component (RC) ground combat maneuver forces of the United States Army.<sup>15</sup>

The strategy used to form the EBs was based on our national military strategy and focusing on the federal mission of the EBs. There has been much discussion regarding the Guards ability to perform their federal mission, given the tasks of the state mission they must also perform. However, since the EBs are combat units, they already possess the command and control functions necessary to support almost any peacetime engagement in support of it's state mission. It has been shown many times that Guard units do not spend any of there allotted federal training dollars or time in training towards a state mission. However, it is more the case, that Guard units are ready to perform their state missions as an indirect result of the training they conduct in support of their federal mission. <sup>16</sup>

"Enhanced" refers to increased resource and manning priorities applied by the Army and the Army National Guard, coupled with an enhanced training strategy during premobilization that ensure the ability of the EBs to be ready to begin deployment at the highest readiness standard, C-1, no later than ninety days after mobilization.<sup>17</sup> That training strategy will focus on only critical mission essential tasks; *movement to contact, attack, and defend.* The EBs will be closely aligned with active component divisions and corps for training and the enhanced strategy will focus on selected, critical skills during pre-mobilization in order to reduce post-mobilization training <sup>18</sup>

## Enhanced Qualities of the Enhanced Brigades and Who Supports Them

Unique Qualities	Support	
Omque Quantes	Active Component	NGB
DEDICATED RTD SUPPORT	X	
MOBILE TRAINING TEAM	X	
ANNUAL TAM EVALUATION	X	
GFRE SUPPORTED IDT AND AT	LANES X	
METAL APPROVAL	x	
UNIQUE DESIGN	x	
ENHANCED, DIRECTED OVERST	RENGTH	x
FTS, AGR SUPPORTED AT 80%		x
<b>FUNDING, C-1 (PERSONNEL, EO</b>	H, ER) C-3 TRNG	x
85% DMOSQ	•	x
ANNUAL CREW QUALIFICATION	l	x
PLT(CBT) & CO (CS/CSS) PROFIG	CIENCY	x
STAFF SIMULATION TRAINING	ANNUALLY	x

Figure 3 The enhanced qualities and the supporting element that is responsibility

#### **END STATE - THE PLANNING GUIDANCE**

The functions and capabilities of the EBs can be broken down into four very uncompounded categories; reinforce, augment, backfill and rotational. They are simple, easily understood functions that allow the brigades to concentrate their efforts in four very basic areas.

The EBs will be employed using guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). They will be apportioned for deliberate planning to the Combatant Commanders (CINC's). The essential characteristic of the EBs, within the context of missions and employment considerations, is wartime flexibility. They must be able to be

employed into any contingency. EBs will normally operate as part of an AC division or corps. The strategic needs of the warfighting CINC will dictate which of the two major regional contingencies and which division or corps the EBs will be deployed to after completing their post mobilization training.<sup>19</sup>

#### **END STATE - THE DESIGN AND STRUCTURE**

With flexibility in mind, the EBs were designed into four tables of organization and allowances (TO&E's). There are seven EBs organized into a heavy brigade configuration, which include the mechanized and armor, seven into a light configuration and one configured as an armored cavalry regiment/brigade. Each brigade has been given the necessary support slices to allow it to complete their mission without relying on additional forces. Each brigade contains it's own support battalion, slice of engineers, military police, artillery, chemical, cavalry or aviation troop or squadron, intelligence slice and air defense




Figure 4 Organization of the Enhanced Light Infantry Brigade




Figure 5 Organization of the Enhanced Mechanized Infantry Brigade




Figure 6 Organization of the Enhanced Armor Brigade




Figure 7 Organization of the Enhanced Cavalry Squadron

slice. They are designed very similar to separate brigades in structure, but are planned to support existing Active divisions or corps.

#### **END STATE - THE DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA**

The criteria for deploying the EBs is the criteria set forth in the standard for the entire Army - the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System. Under this system, the highest readiness rating of C-1 is the goal. The DPG clearly sets this as the deployment standard for the EBs. In order to meet this deployment standard, the premobilization goal will be to sustain the EBs at C-1 in personnel, equipment readiness, and equipment on hand, and a C-3 in training during pre-mobilization. The EBs are allowed 5-8% over-strength to ensure a C-1 ability in personnel. In addition, their Full-Time Support package will be enhanced.<sup>20</sup>

#### **WAYS - THE TRAINING STRATEGY**

The key to any training strategy is to make it simple enough to support yet comprehensive enough to accomplish the mission. With those principals in mind, the training strategy for the fifteen EBs has been written with simplicity. The requirement for wartime employment flexibility led the Enhanced Brigade Task Force to recommend three mission essential tasks to facilitate enhanced pre-mobilization training. Past experiences, namely the Gulf War, have shown the tremendous importance of not only the pre-mobilization training package and evaluation but the absolute necessity to have in place a logical, focused, and supportable post mobilization plan.<sup>21</sup>

The three pre-mobilization mission essential tasks are *movement to contact*, *attack* and *defend*. Prior to deployment, additional operational requirements may be identified by the EBs gaining combatant commander on the basis of an analysis of the mission, enemy, terrain, time, and troops available (METT-T). Post mobilization training may be expanded, as required, to train any additional tasks that will be required by the gaining Combatant Commander.<sup>22</sup>

The missions: *movement to contact, attack* and *defend* were chosen for two reasons. First, they are basic building blocks common to almost all combat operations. Second, approximately 85% of the identified "core skills" are common to all three missions. Regardless of the planning scenario, future combat operations will almost certainly contain some combination of the missions *movement to contact, attack* and *defend*. By focusing scarce training resources on these missions, EB commanders will be able to ensure that their units are trained to standard in these three missions.<sup>23</sup>

EB commanders, after mission analysis, must focus scarce resources on the most important missions. Improved training strategies will alleviate some pressure, but limited time available for training will remain the major challenge. Focusing on this narrow band of missions and critical core tasks is the most practical way for commanders to ensure the deployability of an EB within ninety days of mobilization.<sup>24</sup>

In April, 1994, the Chief of Staff (CSA), U.S. Army, directed Headquarters, Forces Command (FORSCOM) to develop and test a training strategy for the EBs to prepare them to deploy within ninety days of post-mobilization training. There effort was to be assisted by Headquarters, Training Doctrine (TRADOC), the Army staff and NGB. The task was then further assigned by mission. The U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY was tasked with writing the training strategy for the heavy configured EBs and the cavalry regiment while the U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA was tasked to write the training strategy for the light configured brigades.

Although the strategy developed is specific for the individual TO&E EBs, light, heavy and cavalry, all three strategies were written with the same over-arching guidance.

"Develop a pre-mobilization training strategy that when coupled with a post-mobilization strategy enables the EBs to achieve a training readiness level so that units are ready to deploy not later than ninety days after call-up."<sup>25</sup>

"The training strategy for the EBs is a model of a comprehensive training strategy that ensures the integration of combat, combat service and combat service support units of the brigade. It describes how units train, and identifies the training focus, and necessary resources required to achieve a sustained training base. Additionally, this

strategy identifies specific training missions and tasks required for a unit to maintain the proper level of combat readiness. It expands on current unit training limitations by integrating training events with an array of training techniques, training aids, devices, simulators and simulators (TADSS), which increase readiness."<sup>26</sup>

"The EBs training strategy is based on a training continuum. The continuums' initial focus is achievement of the basic training tenets to ensure a sustained readiness level through utilization of a training 'band of excellence'. The basis tenets are training objectives which are battle-focused, descriptive, as well as attainable. The training 'band of excellence' provides unit's task training at the minimum frequency necessary for sustainment to progress through the training continuum. The training 'band of excellence' is an essential element within this strategy as it established the pathway and basic building blocks for additional or follow-on training. A critical factor in building this 'band of excellence' is consciously narrowing the training focus to a reduced number of critical tasks required for mission accomplishment. The refocusing process is accomplished through the selection and establishment of Core Critical Tasks (CCT) lists. CCTs form the foundation for both the training continuum, and the 'band of excellence', thereby, providing a platform for training sustainment."<sup>27</sup>

"Sustainment training is often misunderstood, although it is a reasonable, common sense approach to training. Sustainment training must maintain skills to high standards often enough to prevent skill decay and to train new soldiers. EBs must be prepared to accomplish their wartime missions by training within the 'band of excellence'; they cannot rely on infrequent 'peaking' to the appropriate level of wartime proficiency. Sustainment

training enables units to operate within the 'band of excellence' through appropriate repetitions of CCTs during prime training periods."<sup>28</sup>

Sustainment training plays an additional role with this strategy, by providing progressive training paths in both the pre- and post-mobilization phases. The reoccurring




Figure 8 Post-mobilization training requirements

training base, or sustainment training for the strategy, is provided in the pre-mobilization phase. Whereas, the building block, or groundwork, to begin training other tasks not identified as core critical is provided in the post-mobilization phase. This established groundwork is extremely important due to the expected limited time available during post-mobilization.<sup>29</sup>

Once units have achieved a sustained level of training proficiency, this model structures training in cyclic, progressive, flexible stages primarily focused on maintaining training sustainment. The structure provides commanders the ability to assess a units training proficiency after completion of the training model and determine the appropriate level to reenter the strategy. This structure furnishes the commander and units with continuous, progressive training strategy rather than starting from square-one again.<sup>30</sup>

Post-mobilization training focuses on tasks not identified or trained subsequent to mobilization due to several factors. Those factors being; training limitations such as available resources or maneuver areas; METT-T, not knowing geographically where the unit will deploy; and CINC requirements. These factors and other unit shortfalls must be compensated for during post-mobilization training phase of not more than ninety days.<sup>31</sup>

Post-mobilization training focuses on the incorporation of tasks not deemed core critical while increasing the complexity of the units current training objectives. This phase will also provide units an opportunity to increase optempo with regards to staff, maneuver, and gunnery training. In addition, the post mobilization phase provides an opportunity to train those tasks that were hindered by aforementioned factors. Resource constraints, training limitations, and other factors not available during the pre-mobilization phase now gain a higher priority within the training system. During the post-mobilization phase, specific METT-T requirements and CINC directives are provided to the unit by the gaining command. These requirements are based upon an anticipated area of deployment, or other operational concerns. These factors provide the commander and units additional

training requirements not identified prior to the post-mobilization phase.<sup>32</sup> Specific training requirements are identified for the various EB configurations.

### The Mounted Heavy and Cavalry Enhanced Brigades

#### SPECIFIC TRAINING GUIDANCE:

- 1. Provide a training strategy that integrates more maneuver vs. gunnery training within available time (goal is not more than 50% gunnery).
- 2. Provide a training strategy that identifies and integrates core tasks (skills).
- 3. Provide a training strategy that integrates all programmed training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS).
- 4. Provide a training strategy that provides an alternative armor gunnery strategy integrated into the training strategy so that gunnery crews are able to achieve Table XII in a post-mob gunnery program that lasts not more than twenty-one days.<sup>33</sup>

"The training strategy development was configured and time lined into three distinct phases of a campaign plan. Each phase of the project was developed and categorized utilizing factors established by higher tasking and a project team. Each of these categories were cross-walked through an evaluation and analysis phase to determine appropriate recommendations and conclusions for the strategy.

In Phase I, the project addressed in broad terms the training strategy for enhanced mounted brigades utilizing several base assumptions and considerations. Key to this phase was the development of core critical tasks and major training events for command

and staff, maneuver, combat support, and combat service support elements of the brigade. Additional emphasis was placed on an alternative armor gunnery strategy focused on integrating more maneuver versus gunnery training. The strategy followed existing operational doctrine in the development of the model; however, the strategy was not limited or restricted by current doctrine for its initial outlook.

In Phase II, training models were developed in sufficient detail for command and staff, and maneuver units within the enhanced mounted brigades. Emphasis was placed on expanding and leveraging areas associated with time compression, distribution and modernization of training, and prioritization of missions to fight and decisively win.

Phase III, synchronized training models were developed for combat support and combat service support elements of the enhanced mounted brigades. These models provide the linkage to support combat maneuver elements, thereby, establishing proper synchronization of units on tomorrow's future battlefield."<sup>34</sup>

Parameters were established for formulating the CCTs for the mounted brigades. A task analysis was conducted to identify core critical tasks based on the following established definitions.

"Maneuver CCTs: Those individual and collective battle-focused tasks that the brigade must train to succeed in conducting *movement to Contact, attack, and defend.* CCTs directly influence the success or failure of the next higher echelon tasks.

Gunnery CCTs: Those individual and collective tasks that crews and platoons must do to effectively employ the weapon system."<sup>35</sup>

Utilizing the appropriate Army Training and Evaluation Plan (ARTEP) and Mission Training Plans (MTPs), each collective task went through several screening processes to determine whether it was a CCT. The initial process utilized for the selection of CCTs was the identification of the tasks associated with the three basic Mission Essential Task List (METL) tasks. <sup>34</sup>

#### The Light Infantry Enhanced Brigades

#### SPECIFIC TRAINING GUIDANCE:

- 1. Provide a training strategy that achieves an annual squad Live-Fire Exercise and a platoon evaluation conducted to ARTEP standards. The annual goal of each infantry battalion is to conduct platoon live-fire exercises and/or company level maneuver training or higher.
- 2. Provide a training strategy that identifies and integrates CCTs.
- 3. Provide a training strategy that integrates all programmed training aids, devices, simulator, and simulations. It will also include the considerations for reduced resources, particularly time.<sup>35</sup>

"An in depth doctrinal walk was conducted using methodology consistent with provisions of the Combined Army Training Strategy (CATS); FM 25-100 and FM 25-101; the STRAC and the training readiness provisions of AR 220-1. Missions including tasks from brigade to individual were cross-walked to include assigning times to each task (event) and its appropriate learn, train, test sustain time frame. As a result, those battle

tasks which support the essential three METL tasks were identified and written into the premobilization training strategy.

Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) was used to create the sustainable cycle of training necessary to achieve the highest possible readiness. The planning was done based on a time management system. Using PERT the planners were able to state assumptions about the METL in a logical sequence; analyze and schedule resources (manpower, equipment, funds, facilities, ranges, training areas and optempo) in support of sequential training events; provide a detailed road map of that sequential training; and provide the necessary scheduling to accomplish the training. The result was a time management program that diagrammed logical sequential training tasks into critical revolving training time blocks."

"The cross-walk review encompassed all combat unit training requirements to include, individual, leader, crew, squad, platoon, company;, battalion, brigade and staff collective tasks. The training strategy review addressed all the battlefield operating systems (BOS) within the brigade to include combat, combat support and combat service support at all levels of command."<sup>37</sup>

The training strategy was developed using a three step approach or phases. Phase I, the Doctrinal Review consisted of a close examination of the task definition in both Field Manual (FM) and associated ARTEPs. The two areas concentrated on were doctrinal correctness and continuity and; correlation of critical tasks to supporting tasks. The product of the research was the CCT list for each unit.

Phase II was the development of the PERT and Phase III was the Subject Matter Expert (SME) synchronization with proponencies. Each branch doctrine associated with a particular unit was closely examined for doctrinal cross referencing. This was done in order to proof the synchronization of support branches to the infantry doctrine.<sup>38</sup>

The light EBs training strategy contains PERT's for each unit of the Enhanced Infantry Brigade. These PERT's reflect the relationship of CCT's to unit training progression to proficiency. Squad development leads to platoon development and so on. Times, based on extensive research are applied to each task.

#### **MEANS - TRAINING SUPPORT**

Public Law 190-484, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Title XI, commonly known as the "Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of I992" set into motion a host of actions designed to support the RCs; in this case the Army National Guard. The program's goal is to ultimately reduce post-mobilization training time for designated RC units. The reduction will be done by providing those designated RC units with AC personnel to assist the RC commander to plan, organize and support the execution of battle-focused training.<sup>39</sup>

The AC dedicated support to the RC program is a training partnership between the AC and RC that provides training assistance and evaluation to RC units for unit collective training (lane) and computer assisted command and staff training. The partnership provides RC units significantly improved pre-mobilization training and a structure for post mobilization collective training. It also provides Continental U.S. Army (CONUSA), Corp,

Adjutants General (AG) and Army Reserve commands/regional support commands mechanisms to effectively identify and address peacetime and wartime requirements.

The program uses three approaches. (1) Dedicated Direct Support Manpower; AC personnel are provided to support training and readiness efforts of the RC chain of command. Specifically, Resident Training Detachments (RTD) for EBs and Force Support Package (FSP) units. Also, Field Training Groups (FTG) are dedicated to support National Guard combat divisions. (2) Geographically oriented support units; Units specifically organized to support the missions of designated RC units by area. Geographic units are Readiness Groups (RG), Regional Training Teams (RTT), Operation Readiness Exercise (ORE) Teams, and those units that comprise the Ground Force Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) initiatives. (3) Special purpose units; A unit tailored to perform a narrowly defined mission. Special purpose units are the Brigade Command and Battle Staff Training (BCBST) augmenters at the Command and General Staff College, Fort. Leavenworth, KS; the Virtual Reality Training Team, Fort. Knox, KY; and the Third U.S. Army augmentation.<sup>40</sup>

This support program is based on several assumptions. They include:

- 1. The RC chain of command is responsible for training RC units.
- 2. Associated AC units are responsible for training assistance and evaluation of the associated RC units. Regional Training Teams/Resident Training Detachments assigned in support of RC units do not affect these requirements.
- 3. The program will be only as effective as the flow of appropriate communications between the participants, especially at the senior leadership levels.

- 4. RC unit personnel can improve mission performance if provided cooperative advice and assistance of qualified AC personnel.
- 5. Support of the program is available using tri-component funding methodology used by Headquarters, Department of Army (HQDA).
- 6. Program funding and allocation of personnel are required by law and therefore subject to budget and personnel distribution plan decrements only in competition with other statutory programs.
- 7. Forces Command is the HQDA executive agent for this program.<sup>41</sup>




Figure 9 The Ground Force Readiness Enhancement organization

Personnel in the various positions of the aforementioned mentioned support packages will be critical to the success of the training strategies associated with the EBs. DA has taken a significant step towards accomplishment of that strategy with this program.

#### **MEANS - DIRECTED TRAINING ASSOCIATIONS**

One of the enhancements to the EBs is the Directed Training Association (DTA) each brigade has with an AC division or corps. Under this program, the Secretary of the Army required each of the brigades to be associated with an active-duty combat unit, either a division or a corps. This is not an organizational assignment but a training association. Under the agreement, the AC commander is responsible for:

- 1. Approving the training program of the associated EB
- 2. Reviewing the readiness report of the associated EB
- 3. Assessing the manpower, equipment, and training resources required of the associated EB
- 4. Validating, not less often than annually, the compatibility of the associated EB with AC forces

The idea of the DTA is to provide the EBs with the expertise and experience from the AC. The DTA coupled with the AC full time support packages in the GFRE program give each brigade a tremendous enhancement and assistance program.<sup>42</sup>

## **Enhanced Brigade Directed Training Associations**

HQTRS	AC ASSOCIATE	EB
I CORP	1/25 ID (L)	41 IN
I CORP	3/2 ID (M)	81 IN (M)
III CORP	1 CAV	45 IN
III CORP	1 CAV	155 AR
III CORP	1/1 ID (M)	218 IN (M)
III CORP	4 ID (M)	256 IN (M)
III CORP	3/4 ID (M)	116 ACR
III CORP	3 ACR	278 ACR
XVIII CORP	10 MTN DIV	27 IN
XVIII CORP	3 ID (M)	30 IN (M)
XVIII CORP	3 ID (M)	48 IN (M)
XVIII CORP	82 ABN	53 IN
XVIII CORP	101 ABN	39 IN
XVIII CORP	101 ABN	76 IN
USARPAC	25 ID (L)	29 IN

Figure 10 The Directed Training Association for each Enhanced Brigade

#### **MEANS - COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS**

#### AND BRIGADE LEVEL COMMAND AND STAFF TRAINING

NGB, along with FORSCOM, has developed training guidance for planning and executing Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations and Brigade Combat Refresher Courses (CBRC). Annually, FORSCOM provides the Army National Guard one rotation at both the National Training Center (NTC), Fort. Irwin, CA and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) located at Fort. Polk, LA. The heavy or mounted brigades conduct their rotation at Ft. Irwin and the light configured brigades attend Ft. Polk. That computes to each EB going through a CTC every eight years. National Guard Bureau has developed a plan to also put each EB through a NTC/JRTC "like experience" four years prior to their NTC/JRTC

rotation. During the year of the CTC "like experience," the EB will not participate in any other CTC event.<sup>43</sup>

The "like experience" training strategy is currently being developed to allow each EB a "like" CTC experience half between each CTC rotation. They will be conducted at specified locations with support coming from both the associated division and the full time support described in the GFRE program. Budget and manpower policy is currently being developed to support this strategy.

EBs will attend a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) rotation with their active component associated division or corps or with an AC division or corps as part of a heavy/light force mix rotation, which will put them through that program approximately every three to four years. In conjunction, each EB will support a Warfighting Exercise (WFX) conducted by their AC associated division.<sup>44</sup>

The EBs will attend a Brigade Command and Battle Staff Training Program (BCBST) each year the unit in not attending a CTC event such as NTC, JRTC and BCTP. The unit will follow their rotation at the BCBST with a Brigade Simulation Exercise (BBX) in the same year.

The Combat Brigade Refresher Course is not a CTC event. The course was developed to assist units preparing for a CTC rotation. The objective of the course is to provide the commander and staff with an up-to-date understanding of tactical and logistical doctrine, provide assistance in preparation of orders and plans, and enhance staff team work through application of the tactical decision making process. The course is designed

to be conducted during a multi-unit training assembly (MUTA)-4 or MUTA-5. One MUTA is four hours long, so the course is designed to be given in a 16 to 20 hour block.<sup>45</sup>

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

There are many questions that remain to be answered. As the EBs continue to be activated, resourced, trained and evaluated, many of those questions will be answered. Some, more than likely will not. For example, when will the EBs be mobilized? Will it be at the start of a "first" Major Regional Contingency (MRC), thus insuring that they are ready if a second MRC should arise? In accordance with the DPG, current plans are based on the underlying assumption that four-five AC divisions will be adequate to win a MRC. However, the need to respond to cases in which the initially-planned forces are inadequate must be considered in the overall design of both AC and RC force structure. One view is that some or all of the EBs would be mobilized only if, due to unforeseen developments, the AC is unable to deploy sufficient combat forces to win the MRC (or MRCs, if a second one erupts) by itself. The other view is that there are strong public policy reasons to mobilize RC combat forces in the event of even one MRC, irrespective of whether the AC may be able to handle it alone.<sup>46</sup>

It is strongly recommended that mobilization planning be written to include mobilizing EBs whenever a situation occurs that requires mobilizing the forces necessary to engage one MRC. Which particular EBs and how many mobilized would be determined by the actual situation, considering all the elements of METT-T. This recommendation is made because of several reasons, of which the most important are:

- (1) Mobilizing EBs at the start of one MRC, or at least a first MRC, would provide for the strategic hedge necessary if a second MRC would unfold. EBs would be that much further along in their post-mobilization training when and if a second MRC emerged.
- (2) Mobilizing National Guard EBs would ensure the public support which is absolutely necessary whenever our military is called into conflict. This was witnessed during Desert Storm and proved to be one of the key factors which rallied public support for this conflict.
- (3) By mobilizing EBs concurrently with the first MRC, the EBs are immediately put into the post-mobilization training cycle. Once they are their, AC elements can continue to deployed to the first MRC and even to a second. If in fact, the first deployed AC elements were not able to contain the first MRC, and additional AC forces were needed to reinforce




Figure 11 Post-mobilization generation schedule for the heavy configured Enhanced Brigades

in the first MRC, those forces would not be available if a second MRC became active. Waiting to mobilize the EBs until after all AC forces are deployed could significantly hinder our ability to hold and delay, or even to win a second MRC if the first MRC does not go as well as planned. A chart depicting post-mobilization generation of heavy EBs is shown in figure 11.

(4) The last key factor behind this recommendation is the support strategy involved in the post-mobilization training phase for the EBs. It is imperative that the AC support required for EBs post-mobilization training be available. If the EBs are not planned to be engaged in any future conflict until all the AC combat units are deployed, who is left to support the post-mobilization for the EBs?

The manner in which this issue is resolved has important implications for both how the EBs are structured and aligned with AC formations and how they are missioned. The structure and alignment issue is central to a number of areas. Foremost among them is that of whether the NCA should anticipate mobilizing and deploying an EB whenever "its" AC division deploys. Although the association with the AC division or corp is for training purposes, would it not be prudent and make sense to keep that alignment for as many deployments as practical? An integral part of the analysis is differentiating between short-notice contingencies (like Grenada and Panama) and the buildup for what is obviously developing into a MRC (like Dessert Storm).

The question presented is whether the war-fighting portion of America's Army will continue to be "Total Army" or whether, under any foreseeable and predictable scenario,

the combat maneuver elements will be all AC. The most pertinent vehicle for resolving this is the relationship between each EB and its corresponding AC corp or division.<sup>47</sup>

One view is that the EBs should have only training relationships with AC corp and divisions, i.e. that "roundup/roundout" as previously known are inappropriate to the requirements of the future. The adherents of this view hold that, if we too closely link the EBs and the divisions, we will deprive the war planners of the flexibility they need to reroute an EB from MRC one to MRC two, which begins brewing while the EB is completing its post-mobilization training.

The other view would link each EB with a particular AC division or corp for more than just a training relationship. The divisional brigades would be the "fourth brigade", the Round-Up brigade for all planning purposes. This would not preclude the flexing of the brigade to another theater; an EB would have no greater immunity from that eventuality than would any AC division unit. This view would define the "hooks of connectivity" in terms that extend beyond communications and data systems; it places major emphasis on shared training experiences and common operational language. Divisions often speak a unique language which they expect brigades to understand and share. Each division has its own Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TSOP) and depends in combat on the ability of subordinate units to be familiar with and operate in accordance.h it. To require every EB to internalize the language and TSOP of every division and corp in the Army with which it might be tasked to operate seems somewhat ambitious.<sup>48</sup>

It is strongly recommended that the EBs be aligned with their AC counterpoint in a stronger, more binding manner than for just training. The EBs should be assigned to the

AC counterpart with the AC taking on increased responsibility. This would ensure the cementing of the two forces and would give the AC unit a greater role in the training process and all ensuing areas.<sup>49</sup> Under an AC assigned role, the AC commander would have a direct influence on all areas of support such as school training slots, equipment compatibility, CTC rotational slots, brigade commander selection process and many other areas. The EB would be a reinforcing brigade to the division, meant to join up with the division, once post-mobilization training is completed. The AC division or corps commander would view the EB with a much greater degree of interest and intensity if in fact the EB was to be a supporting unit to the parent AC commander.

If in fact a CTC rotation is required prior to deployment as it was during Desert Storm, the deployment criteria for the EBs grows substantially and the ability of the EBs to meet that requirement is vastly dependent on several factors, availability of rotational slots at the CTCs for one. Since it is a known fact that the U.S. does not possess the air and sea lift capability to simultaneously move all of the forces required for a two MRC strategy is it prudent to resource the requirement to keep all fifteen of the EBs at C-1 all of the time?

While it is too early to document the factors associated with the effort of maintaining fifteen EBs at a C-I status, it is not hard to imagine that the cost in money, personnel turn-over and time in achieving such a task will be great. It would seem prudent to develop an alternative strategy to allow a tiered-readiness equation to provide a designated number of EBs at C-1 at any given time. Then develop an associated resourcing strategy that would bring the remaining EBs, to a C-1 status in personnel,

equipment readiness and equipment on hand over a selected period of time. This will no doubt occur in the future if, in fact, the cost of maintaining fifteen EBs at C-1, the personnel turnover and the associated commitment of time prove to be too great.

#### CONCLUSION

This report has examined the EBs by looking at the ways, means, and ends and has made recommendations concerning issues that affect the eventual end-states of the EBs. The ways and means make up the strategy of the EBs. On the surface, the strategy appears sound and logical with an excellent chance of producing the desired end state. That will depend, however, on several key factors that the strategy calls for but has by no means the ability to ensure. Some of those would include leadership, fiscal support, equipment resourcing, availability of AC personnel to support the EBs, CTC rotation slots and available educational slots to ensure education requirements of RC primary leaders, both officer and non-commissioned officers. The list is by no means complete.

One of the most critical factors affecting the training strategy of the EBs, however, is the cooperation and commitment of both the RC and AC personnel. In this case that involves NGB, the state AGs and their staffs and the members of the brigades themselves. It also includes DA, the AC divisions and corps and the support packages, such as the RTD's and other personnel under the GFRE program, along with Readiness Group (RG) personnel and other AC support programs. The attitude projected by these organizations, not only towards the EBs themselves, but towards the entire RC/AC relationship, will be critical to the success of not only the EB program, but to the success of our DPG in

support of our NMS. It is with that criticality that the recommendations suggested in this report are made.

Many questions remain to be answered concerning the EBs. In time most, if not all will be answered. But in a crisis, time is not an abundant commodity. Although the training strategy for the fifteen EBs is now in place and appears to be logical and supportive, the next few years will undoubtedly provide necessary changes and adjustments. Answers to other questions, however, several of them included in this report, need to be obtained long before the next crisis is faced by Army forces of the United States

#### **ENDNOTES**

- 1. Department of Defense, Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.): U.S. Department of Defense, 1993, 91.
  - 2. Ibid.
  - 3. Ibid.
- 4. Army Initiatives Group, <u>America's Army, Enhanced Brigades</u> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Operation) 1995.
- 5. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., Military Strategy: Theory and Application (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1993), 3.
  - 6. Ibid.
  - 7. Ibid.
  - 8. Ibid.
- 9. Robert L. Goldich, "Iraq Kuwait Crisis: U.S. Reserve Call-Up and Reliance on the Reserves" (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December, 1990) 2.
  - 10. Ibid.
  - 11. Ibid., idem, Bottom-Up Review, 93.
- 12. Army Initiatives Group, <u>America's Army, Enhanced Brigades</u> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations) 1995.
  - 13. Ibid.
  - 14. Ibid.
  - 15. Ibid.

- 16. Congress, House, Deborah R. Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services, Military Forces & Personnel Subcommittee, 103rd Congress, 2nd sess., Congressional Record (8 March 1994), vol. H201 pt. 3.1.
- 17. Congress, Senate, Deborah R. Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, prepared statement before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Force Requirements and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess., Congressional Record (10 June 1993) vol.S210, pt. 6.5.
  - 18. Ibid, idem., America's Army, Enhanced Brigades.
  - 19. lbid.
  - 20. Ibid.
- 21. U.S. Government, General Services Administration, National Guard: Peacetime

  Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War, Government

  Accounting Office Report GAO/NSIAD-91-263, September 24, 1991.
  - 22. Ibid, idem., America's Army, Enhanced Brigades.
  - 23. Ibid.
  - 24. Ibid.
  - 25. Ibid.
- 26. U.S. Army Armor Center, Ft. Knox, KY, <u>Enhanced Mounted Brigade Training</u> Strategy, March 1995, 3-2.
  - 27. Ibid.
  - 28. Ibid, 3-3.
  - 29. Ibid.

- 30. Ibid.
- 31. lbid.
- 32. Ibid.
- 33. Ibid, 1-2.
- 34. Ibid.
- 35. Ibid, idem., Enhanced Mounted Brigade Training Strategy. 2-1.
- 35. Ibid, 1-2.
- 36. U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, <u>Enhanced Infantry Brigade Training</u>

  <u>Strategy</u> (Coordinating Draft), July 1995, 2.
  - 37. Ibid, 4.
  - 37. Ibid, 5.
  - 38. Ibid, 5.
- 39. Public Law 190-484, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Title XI, Section 1101-1137, known as the "Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992" (commonly called "Title XI); as amended by Public Law 103-160, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Section 520.
- 40. Chief of LTG Staff George A. Fisher, Jr., U.S. Army Forces Command, "Active Component (AC) Dedicated Support to the Reserve Component (RC) Program," memorandum for Military Departments, Ft. McPherson, GA, 22 October, 1995.
  - 41. Ibid.
  - 42. Ibid,
- 43. Director, Operations, Training and Readiness, COL Eric W. Braman, National Guard Bureau, "FY96\_Combat Training Center (CTC) Guidance," memorandum for Military

Departments. Washington, D.C., 1 August 1995.

- 44. Ibid.
- 45. Ibid.
- 46. Ibid.
- 47. Ibid.
- 48. Ibid.
- 49. U.S. Government General Services Administration, Roles and Missions of the Guard Combat Units (Draft), Washington, D.C., October 1995, 19.
- 50. Task Force Report, Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades, National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C., January 1996.

#### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Baca, Edward D., <u>1996 Posture Statement of the National Guard Bureau</u> (Draft), Washington, D.C., 1996
- Goff, David E. (LTC), Senior Service Fellow, International
  Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

  Mobilization and Unit Readiness: The Impact of Mobilization on Unit Readiness Status
  of Army National Guard Units Activated During Operation Dessert Storm, U.S. Army
  War College, Carlisle, PA, 1993.
- Mathews, William. "Trade-Offs Shape Top Army Guard Units." <u>Army Times</u> 55 no. 8 (September 19, 1994) 22.
- McAndrews, Kevin (LT). "Enhanced Readiness Brigades," <u>National Guard</u> 49 no. 9 (September 1995), 22-24
- Perry, Dr. William, "Just What The Doctor Ordered." Interview with the U.S. Secretary of Defense by National Guard magazine, 49 no. 9 (September 1995), 28.
- Perry, William J. "More Realism, Readiness, Operations For The Guard and Reserve," <u>Defense Issues</u> 10 no.15 (1995) 1-4.
- Roos, John G. "Lingering Readiness Pains; National Guards Enhanced Brigades." <u>Armed Forces Journal International</u> 133 no. 2 (September 1995) 52.
- U.S. Department of the Army, <u>Enhanced Mounted Brigade Training Strategy</u>, U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort. Knox, KY, March 1995.

Brigade (Coordinating Draft), U.S. Army Infantry School, Ft. Benning, GA, July 1995.

U.S. Department of Defense. Report on the Bottom-Up Review. Report prepared by Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, (Washington, D.C.): October, 1993.

U.S. Army, Initiatives Group, America's Army: The Enhanced Brigades, Washington, D.C., 1994.

U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., 1995.

U.S. Government General Accounting Office, The National Guard: Defending the Nation and States, Washington, D.C., April 1993.

Military Readiness: Improving Assessment Measures Are Evolving. Washington, D.C., March 1995.

Roles and Missions of the Guard Combat Units

(Draft), Washington, D.C., October 1995.

U.S. Department of the Army, <u>Enhanced Brigade Training Strategy: Enhanced Infantry</u>